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Definitions 
Socialism is best defined very broadly, as the doctrine that capitalism has very 
serious problems, and that a substantial degree of public ownership is needed to solve 
them. On this definition, ‘socialism’ would include Marxists, Fabians, Utopians, 
Anarcho-Communists and even conservative (Bismarckian) State Socialists. Social 
democracy is an even more slippery term. In the late nineteenth century it was used 
by socialists of many persuasions, often but not always Marxist or Marxist-
influenced, to express the conviction that society and the economy, as well as the 
polity, must be democratised. This was not seen as inconsistent either with the 
achievement of socialism through revolution, or even with a period of dictatorship 
after the revolution: in Russia, for example, the full name of the Bolshevik party was 
the RSDLP(B), or Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolshevik).  
After 1917, however, ‘social democracy’ was increasingly used to distinguish 
non-revolutionary or ‘reformist’ socialists from their bitter rivals in the international 
Communist movement. From 1945, it also came to connote a major revision of 
traditional socialist orthodoxy, involving a new commitment to a ‘mixed’ economy 
in which a large private sector would remain as a permanent feature. In the early 
1980s the term ‘social democratic’ was appropriated by a right-wing breakaway from 
the (already very conservative) Labour Party in Britain, but by the end of the century 
it had fallen into disuse. It is best thought of today as characterising the economic 
policies that had been endorsed by non-Communist socialists in and out of ‘Labour’, 
‘Socialist’ and (in some countries) ‘Social Democratic’ parties, especially in Western 
Europe and Australasia, down to about 1980. On this definition, few if any centre-left 
parties are now socialist or social democratic, and, arguably, the Democratic Party in 
the US never has been. However, socialist and social democratic ideas are not dead. 
They continue to inspire Green parties around the world, though neoliberal thinking 
is increasingly in the ascendant there, too. They certainly resonate strongly in the 
global justice movement that erupted in the late 1990s, albeit radically altered to 
incorporate the so-called ‘new social movements’ (especially feminism), questions of 
environmental sustainability, and the global nature of the capitalist market. 
In the remainder of this entry, the term ‘socialist’ will be used in a very broad 
sense to denote both social democratic and socialist ideas. For a general historical 
discussion, see King (2003b), Lichtheim (1983) and Sassoon (1996). 
 
In The Beginning 
The most famous statement of socialist principles was written in 1847 by Friedrich 
Engels and Karl Marx. The Communist Manifesto emphasises the revolutionary and 
universal character of the capitalist system, which is inherently cosmopolitan and 
cannot avoid dissolving the national basis of production and exchange: ‘It compels 
all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production’ (Marx 
and Engels 1998:244). It sets out a transitional programme for the working-class 
movement. The details would differ in different countries, Marx and Engels 
suggested, but the broad outlines were ‘pretty generally applicable’ throughout the 
world. Their demands included the abolition of private property in land; a heavy 
progressive income tax; abolition of the right of inheritance; centralisation of credit, 
and of the means of communication and transport, in the hands of the state; an 
extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; a universal 
obligation to work; and free education for all children in public schools (pp. 257-8). 
In the Communist Manifesto it is taken for granted that the interests of working 
people are everywhere the same, and the concluding lines are intended as much more 
than mere rhetoric: ‘The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have 
a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!’ (p. 268). 
Half a century later, the Erfurt Programme of the Social Democratic Party in 
imperial Germany repeated these claims (Russell 1965:137-41). The global 
dimension was explicitly recognised. The proletariat faced the same problems, and 
had the same interests, in all capitalist countries. ‘The liberation of the working class, 
accordingly, is a work in which the workmen of all civilised countries are equally 
involved’, and the party therefore declared itself to be ‘one with the class-conscious 
workmen of all other countries’ (p.139; original emphasis). The detailed programme 
that followed included a demand for ‘national and international legislation’ to 
establish a maximum eight-hour day, to prohibit night work and child labour, and to 
guarantee at least 36 hours of unbroken rest for all workers each week (p. 141). 
Bertrand Russell commented at the time on the ‘perfectly orthodox Marxianism’ of 
the Erfurt Programme, ‘and its boundless democracy’ (p. 141). He might also have 
noted its moderation, and its global reach. 
In the late 1890s, the ‘revisionist’ opponents of orthodox German Marxism 
argued that a proletarian revolution was both undesirable and unlikely to occur. 
Socialists ought therefore to be satisfied with the progressive, but peaceful, 
piecemeal and gradual, achievement of economic and social reform. In Britain the 
Fabian socialists took a very similar position. In both cases, however, the cumulative 
effect of reforms was expected to be a fundamentally different social order (Webb 
and Webb 1920). The combined effect of the Great Depression and the (apparent) 
success of Stalin’s industrialization of the Soviet Union radicalised Western 
socialists in the 1930s, temporarily increasing the appeal of a centrally planned 
economy under full public ownership. After 1945, however, a new revisionist current 
emerged, arguing that the socialist project must be adapted to take account of major 
changes that had occurred in the nature of capitalism. Some revisionists, like 
Anthony Crosland, even claimed that postwar Britain could no longer be described as 
capitalist. In The Future of Socialism (1956) he argued that ownership of the means 
of production was irrelevant, since large companies were now controlled by 
managers, not by shareholders, and the distribution of income depended more on 
politics (including taxation and government spending policies) than on market forces. 
For Crosland socialism was all about equality, not nationalisation.  It is striking just 
how few references there are, in Crosland’s 529-page book, to either finance or the 
world economy. He worries a little about the balance of payments (Crosland 
1956:380-1), and expresses the hope that banks will lend more to industry (p.437-8), 
but that is about all: there are no references in the index to colonies, development, 
finance, international (anything), trade, world poverty or the World Bank. For 
Crosland, socialism was essentially a local matter, without significant global 
implications. 
 
The Neoliberal Age 
This made sense only on the assumptions, firstly that the capitalist tiger had been 
tamed, so that the system had moved very much closer to socialism, and secondly 
that these changes were irreversible. Both proved to be false. In fairness to Crosland 
and his ilk, it should be stressed that the neoliberal revolution that swept the globe 
after 1975 took everyone by surprise (Howard & King 2008). The neoliberals 
asserted that all social problems had a market solution, with deregulation and 
privatisation as corollaries. Financial markets, in particular, were to resume their pre-
1929 importance, not actually to provide finance to companies (which still relied 
very largely on retained profits) but rather to ensure the maximisation of ‘shareholder 
value’  and to provide a market for corporate control.  
All this was set in the context of a renewed capitalist globalisation, which should 
be seen not as an unavoidable Act of God but rather as a project (Quiggin 2001), 
reflected in the so-called Washington Consensus propagated by the IMF, the World 
Bank, the GATT (and its successor, the WTO) and by the US Treasury. Poor 
countries, especially, should rely upon free trade, unrestricted mobility of capital, 
free markets, sound finance, low taxes and a small public sector to achieve rapid 
economic development; and the rich countries would benefit from ‘the magic of the 
market’, too. The upshot was the steady dismantling of the post-1945 settlement by 
means of privatisation, cuts in welfare spending, big reductions in taxes on 
corporations and rich individuals, the lifting of restrictions on financial markets, and 
far-reaching attacks on labour market regulation and the power of trade unions. All 
this means that socialist and social democratic policy now has an unavoidably 
reactionary flavour, since its principal aim is to reverse the damage done by the 
neoliberals. 
But it is not purely nostalgic. Indeed, it has been given added impetus by the 
global financial crisis of 2008. To cite one recent example, the crisis has prompted a 
statement by twenty prominent heterodox economists that includes demands for 
macroeconomic stabilisation, social justice, environmental sustainability and 
international coordination of national recovery programmes. All would be 
recognizable to, and endorsed by, socialists and social democrats of earlier 
generations (Ash et al. 2009). 
 
Public Ownership 
At least seven socialist arguments for public ownership can be distinguished. First, it 
is a necessary first step in the total transformation of society. Second, much more 
modestly, it enables particular industries to be run more efficiently. Third, 
monopolies should be in public ownership to prevent exploitation of consumers. 
Fourth, public ownership is needed to produce a more equal distribution of wealth 
(and this, in turn, is a pre-condition for real political democracy; the alternative is 
rule by the rich). Fifth, it is essential for macroeconomic stabilization, as only then 
can investment expenditure be varied to offset cyclical fluctuations in economic 
activity. Sixth, in industries producing demerit goods like tobacco and gambling, 
public ownership is the only way to give managers an incentive to restrict consumer 
demand. Seventh, large numbers of public sector jobs are needed if full employment 
is to be maintained. 
The first argument is rejected by revisionist social democrats, and many other 
socialists now accept continuing private ownership of small business and actively 
encourage the growth of self-managed worker cooperatives (Nove 1983). Anti-
socialists have always maintained that the other six objectives can be attained in 
other ways, by a combination of competition, regulation and taxation. These 
objections have some merit, but they completely fail to meet the macroeconomic 
case for public ownership (arguments five and seven) and ignore the political issues 
raised by regulatory capture and tax avoidance (which are related to arguments three 
and six).  
The most interesting questions are those arising from the fourth argument. If 
highly progressive income, wealth and inheritance taxes can be imposed, and do 
generate a drastic reduction in the degree of inequality of wealth without old-
fashioned ‘nationalization’ of the means of production, distribution and exchange, 
what sort of economy─and society─would this create? An egalitarian capitalism, 
along the lines of the ‘property-owning democracy’ that progressive conservatives 
have always claimed to support? Or a decentralized collectivism, with the great bulk 
of shares held by pension funds (Blackburn 2002) or union-controlled mutual funds 
(Arestis 1986)? Would there still be financial markets in such a system? How would 
they be regulated in the social interest? And how would such a pattern of ownership, 
and the corresponding system of regulation, be made consistent with the (often 
conflicting) demands of narrow economic efficiency and the broader concerns of 
social justice and environmental sustainability? Socialists still have a lot of thinking 
to do on all these questions. 
One further socialist argument for public ownership deserves a mention. If there 
are binding political constraints on the amount that can be raised through taxation of 
corporate profits, public share ownership may be the only way in which society can 
obtain an acceptable proportion of total output (Quiggin 2001). On this argument, the 
privatization of highly profitable telecom enterprises (for example) was a mistake, 
whatever the merits of the efficiency, monopoly and macroeconomic arguments for 
their retention in public hands. 
A final issue is especially relevant to socialism in the Third World, and this is 
land reform. Where the majority─or a very large minority─of the working 
population are peasant farmers, the distribution of landed wealth is a critically 
important question. Socialists in Asia and Latin America therefore insist on the need 
to break up large estates and provide land to landless farmers, with an  urgency 
unparalleled in Europe since the late nineteenth century. 
 
Macroeconomic Stability 
For socialists, full employment should be the over-riding goal of macroeconomic 
policy. This entails what Abba Lerner referred to in the 1940s as ‘functional finance’, 
that is, tax and expenditure policy geared to achieving the full employment level of 
output, whatever the implications for public finances. If deficits (even large deficits) 
are required, so be it (Nevile 2003). But government deficits should be seen as at 
least in part, as an endogenous response to a collection of private sector decisions 
which in aggregate imply a private sector surplus. This points to the need to 
encourage private sector spending (Reynolds 2004), in particular by keeping interest 
rates low. Democratic control over monetary policy must therefore be re-established, 
with central banks coming back under parliamentary supervision and full 
employment replacing inflation as their chief priority. Central banks should target 
employment growth, subject to an inflation constraint This is particularly important 
in developing countries like South Africa, where unemployment, open and 
concealed, is  chronically at levels experienced in the rich countries only during the 
Great Depression. Here job creation is, literally, a matter of life and death (Pollin et 
al. 2007).  
This has two implications. In the long run, output must grow at the (Harrod) 
natural rate, which is the rate that gives a constant unemployment percentage. In the 
short run a higher rate of growth will be needed to reduce unemployment to the 
maximum acceptable, or full employment, level, which in the rich countries might be 
as low as 2%. This initial period of very rapid output growth raises the very real 
prospect of a conflict with environmental objectives, which require restrictions on the 
rate of growth of consumption. Environmental concerns aside, there will be an 
inflation constraint on the achievement of full employment, and in all likelihood a 
balance of payments constraint too.  To overcome the inflation constraint, many 
socialists accept the need for an incomes policy, with an explicit commitment to 
maintaining (or perhaps increasing) the wage and salary share of GDP. Price and 
wage controls would be required, with a presumption that both wage-push and profit-
push inflation are potentially important problems.  
Balance of payments constraints can be dealt with in the long run through reform 
of the international financial system (Davidson 2008), and in the short run by re-
regulation of financial markets and (where necessary) temporary increases in tariffs. 
An internationally-coordinated demand expansion would overcome the balance of 
payments constraint on individual national economies. It would almost certainly 
make the inflation constraint more serious, however, since the inelastic supply of 
primary products renders commodity prices sensitive to any significant increase in 
world demand, as became apparent in 2007 and the early months of 2008. Ussher 
(2009) draws on the work of Nicholas Kaldor to advocate a return to the commodity 
price stabilization schemes that operated with some success in the 1950s and 1960s, 
relying on internationally-administered buffer stocks (see also King 2009). This 
would benefit producers as well as consumers by preventing catastrophic price 
collapses like those suffered by cocoa and coffee producers in the late 1990s, and oil 
producers in the final months of 2008. 
Sensible macroeconomic policies must be supplemented by compatible 
microeconomic action, including detailed intervention in financial markets to 
regulate the allocation of credit. One relevant proposal is for the introduction of 
differential reserve requirements, favouring employment-generating investment at 
the expense of speculation. Asset-based reserve requirements would also allow some 
control of asset price bubbles (Palley 2004).  
 
Social Justice 
A return to full employment would be the single most important contribution to 
social justice that economic policy could make. This almost certainly involves 
substantial public employment programmes, with the government acting as employer 
of last resort, offering jobs to all who are willing to work and unable to find private 
sector employment. Socialists would expect those employed in this way to receive 
union-negotiated wage rates appropriate to their skills. More conservative proponents 
of the ‘job guarantee’ would offer only minimum wages (Wray 1998).  
Improvements to social welfare also involve continued public provision of 
pensions and other income maintenance payments,  and the supply of much greater 
quantities of public goods like health care, education and child care by not-for-profit 
institutions that are subject to democratic supervision and control. There must also be 
a firm commitment to gender/ethnicity equality and the reversal of environmental 
decay (which affects the poor more than the rich). Productive public investment in 
these and similar fields would stimulate private investment in related activities, 
leading to ‘crowding in’ rather than to the conservative bugbear of ‘crowding out’. 
Socialists also support re-regulation of the labour market to reduce inequality in 
employment incomes, restrict hours of work and encourage industrial democracy. 
They are natural allies of trade unions and supporters of collective bargaining, but 
recognise that there are increasingly severe limits to what can be achieved through 
bargaining by weak unions, and a corresponding need for political intervention to 
enforce the payment of a living wage (Pollin et al. 2008) and employer acceptance of 
reasonable constraints on working hours. This could be widened to include a much 
broader demand for industrial democracy. Co-determination has proved sufficiently 
unpopular with German business to suggest that there might well be something in it 
for labour, especially if it is combined with an interventionist industry policy giving 
employees some control over corporate investment decisions. The 1980s Swedish 
proposal for wage-earner funds─a form of collective profit-sharing with substantial 
union involvement─also deserves reconsideration as a means of reducing inequalities 
in income and wealth without exposing working people to excessive levels of 
financial risk (Arestis 1986). An alternative is employee ownership of the individual 
enterprise, which would greatly reduce the need for supervision and monitoring of 
the workforce and therefore significantly increase labour productivity (Bowles and 
Gintis 1998). This, however, is open to the powerful objection that working people 
cannot afford to have all their limited financial eggs in one fragile basket. 
Statutory limitations on excessive working hours have already been imposed in 
the European Union, and they have been effective, up to a point. They should be 
supplemented by measures to reverse the pressures of workplace culture that 
contribute to the acceptance of overwork by those who suffer most from it, including 
family-friendly policies that encourage parents to spend more time with their young 
children. The restoration of full employment will make this easier, as it will 
substantially increase the bargaining power of labour (unionised or not) at the 
expense of capital. 
One longstanding proposal with impeccable socialist credentials (Russell 1918; 
Meade 1989) is the payment of an unconditional Basic or Citizens’ Income, financed 
by progressive taxation. Since it offers an alternative source of income to paid 
employment, Basic Income has a number of important advantages. It would value the 
work of carers (who are mostly women), and encourage leisure and voluntary work 
at the expense of consumption. It would, however, be extremely expensive, 
especially if set at a level significantly above the bare requirements for subsistence, 
in which case it would probably have a significant impact on work incentives (and 
corresponding environmental benefits in reducing the full employment or natural rate 
of growth of output). A more conservative version of Basic Income would pay it only 
to those actively engaged in socially desirable non-market activities, including the 
care of young children or elderly relatives. 
 
Tax Reform  
Increased public expenditure will place pressure on government finances, so that tax 
reform is important. Uncontroversially, this must include better enforcement of the 
existing system (closing loopholes and attacking tax havens). It will also require the 
‘green taxes’ detailed below and substantial taxation of wealth, especially (but not 
exclusively) inherited wealth. Taxes on land should be substantially increased, and a 
case can also be made for the replacement of taxes on income by a progressive 
expenditure tax along the lines suggested many years ago by Nicholas Kaldor (1955).  
There is an urgent need to eliminate tax competition between nation-states, which 
generates a fiscal ‘race to the bottom’ and reduces the revenue-raising potential of 
them all. Thus tax policy has an inescapable global dimension. This is acknowledged 
by the many socialists who campaign for the introduction of a financial transactions 
tax, either restricted to foreign exchange dealings, the so-called Tobin tax (Patomäki 
2001), or a more general tax on all financial transactions. Patomäki argues that the 
technical difficulties of implementing the Tobin tax are often exaggerated. In 
particular, it does not require unanimous international endorsement, but could 
initially be introduced by a grouping of states, such as the European Union, with 
other national governments joining the proposed TTO (Tobin Tax Organisation) at a 
later date.  Since the tax is unlikely to eliminate currency speculation altogether, this 
offers the prospect of very significant increases in government revenue (see 
Davidson 2002:ch 12, for some objections).  
 
Environmental Sustainability 
Socialists are less sharply divided from conservatives and liberals on environmental 
questions than on any of the other issues. The fundamental neoclassical principle of 
scarcity does after all apply to nature, whereas it is relevant to labour only in wartime 
and no-one has ever been able to make analytical sense of the notion of ‘scarcity of 
capital’. Most non-socialist economists will agree that the internalisation of 
environmental externalities has not gone very far; that the Coase theorem is almost 
entirely useless as a solution to global warming; and that some elaborate combination 
of regulation, taxation and subsidies will be necessary to bring marginal private costs 
much closer to marginal social costs, and marginal private benefits much closer to 
marginal social benefits, than they are at present (Pearce 1993). 
There is thus a very strong case for a redefinition of total output, replacing (or at 
least supplementing) GDP with measures reflecting environmental goods, leisure, 
non-market and voluntary work. Many socialists would go further, urging a reduction 
in the level of consumption in the rich countries of the world and a corresponding 
repudiation of the consumerist ethic that dominates them (Victor and Rosenbluth 
2007). They would also endorse a fundamental reform of the taxation system to tax 
environmentally damaging activities: the carbon tax is the best-known proposal, with 
salination and water use taxes not far behind. But socialists place less emphasis on 
taxation, and more on direct regulation, given their well-founded objections to the 
neoclassical analysis of substitution in consumption and production. There are also 
sound reasons for rejecting market prices as indices of scarcity,  again contributing to 
socialist scepticism concerning market-based solutions to environmental problems 
(Winnett 2003). Tinkering with the price mechanism is unlikely to be sufficient; a 
more fundamental change in human behaviour, values and styles of life may well be 
necessary to protect the environment in the longer term. 
Socialists are, however, divided on the merits of a steady-state economy (zero 
growth) as a medium- or long-term goal. At least for poor countries, a substantial 
period of rapid growth seems essential in order to secure a decent life for the great 
majority of the population; redistribution from rich to poor is necessary, but not in 
any way sufficient. Assuming for the moment that eliminating growth is desirable, 
there are two potentially very serious problems. In the short- to medium-term, there 
is the previously-noted difficulty of reconciling zero growth with full employment. In 
the long run, if productivity growth is a function of output growth then accepting a 
steady-state economy might require us to renounce dynamic economies of scale, 
posing problems for international competitiveness and worsening the balance of 
payments constraint on employment policy in any individual country. 
‘Environmental responsibility in one country’ may therefore be impracticable for 
narrowly economic reasons alone, quite apart from the global nature of ecological 
systems.  
 
International Responsibility 
Socialists see an urgent need to reform international economic institutions to make 
them democratically accountable and remove their pro-corporation, deflationary, 
neoliberal biases. In the case of the IMF, World Bank and WTO this may well 
require their closure and replacement by entirely new institutions capable of making 
an entirely fresh start. At the very least, the lending advice and conditionality 
imposed by the IMF must be changed, and global counter-cyclical policy promoted 
(Ash et al. 2009). Opposition to any extension of the WTO’s General Agreement on 
Trade in Services is also essential if social welfare provisions are to be protected. 
Socialists also call for re-regulation of international financial markets, and many 
would welcome a return to fixed exchange rates and (perhaps) the restriction of all 
foreign exchange transactions to central banks (as proposed by Davidson 2002). 
Short of this, Patomäki proposes a two-tiered Tobin tax, with the higher rate 
automatically applying in periods of increased currency volatility to dampen the 
incentive for further speculation.  
A number of more contentious suggestions will require further discussion. Among 
the most divisive is the question of alternatives to free trade that could protect the 
interests of low-income groups in both the rich and the poor countries. Socialists in 
the Third World agree with liberal internationalists in the West that the subsidies 
paid to farmers in the US and the European Union have had devastating 
consequences for peasant agriculture in poor countries, and should be eliminated in 
the interests of global justice. Western socialists accept the underlying indictment, 
but might have worries about the implications for small farmers, and low-income 
rural communities, in the West. 
Sharper divisions arise on the question of trade in manufactures and, increasingly, 
in services, where the interests of the working class in (for example) Western Europe 
and China are very difficult to reconcile. Thomas Palley distinguishes trade between 
countries with similar wage levels and socioeconomic systems (‘developed-
developed free trade’) from trade between countries where both wage levels and 
socioeconomic systems are radically different (‘developed-underdeveloped free 
trade’). The latter, he argues, does not necessarily benefit working people in the more 
developed country: ‘In effect, free trade serves to unify the labor markets of 
developed and under-developed countries, and this puts strong downward pressure 
on wages in the developed country. … In this fashion, free trade worsens income 
distribution’ (Palley 1998:166). It also reduces workers’ bargaining power, 
undermining the socioeconomic structure and encouraging a further ‘race to the 
bottom’ in employment standards. Palley suggests that a ‘social tariff’ might be 
imposed ‘to compensate for low wages and lack of commitment to social goals 
regarding the environment, worker health and safety, and social welfare’. The 
revenue might then be redistributed back to the developing countries (Palley 
1998:171). 
Palley’s proposals for the avoidance of ‘social dumping’ reflect what Graham 
Dunkley has termed the ‘Fair Trade’ alternative to free trade. Significantly, Palley 
does not endorse the more radical, ‘unit cost equalisation’, variant of Fair Trade, 
‘based on the specification of minimum wages and conditions, though not actual 
wage rates, the aim being to minimise international “unit cost gaps” as calculated on 
the basis of relative productivity and real wage rates’ (Dunkley 1997:252). The 
problem with this, of course, is the impact on employment opportunities in the poor 
countries. Huge issues arise here concerning the conflict of interest between workers 
in rich and poor countries: the latter would gain if free trade were in effect to create a 
single unified global labour market, while the latter would lose, and lose disastrously. 
A Rawlsian would therefore be inclined to favour free trade, but almost no-one in the 
rich countries is a Rawlsian at the global level. For very similar reasons, none but the 
very rich favour uncontrolled immigration, however strong the moral case for such a 
policy might be. Unfortunately Marx and Engels were wrong:  the interests of 
workers in all countries are not the same. 
Fair Trade is not the only alternative to free trade. Dunkley discusses several 
forms of ‘Managed Trade’, and also what he terms ‘Self-Reliant Trade’, which offers 
‘a chance to be one’s self’, and ‘seeks only to eschew heavy trade dependence for 
key capital, consumer, food, energy, cultural or social requirements’ (ibid., p.255). 
Short of a comprehensive, binding international agreement on environmental 
sustainability, this may be the only way in which respect for nature can be reconciled 
with the brutal facts of learning-by-doing and dynamic economies of scale. 
 
Conclusion 
Socialists agree that the market, while potentially a good servant, has become a very 
poor master. The triumph of neoliberalism, they argue, has been accompanied by 
growing inequality (within and between nations), mass unemployment, 
macroeconomic instability and unsustainable environmental destruction. In political 
terms, it has also undermined democracy and generated a sinister tendency towards 
global plutocracy. Socialist policy therefore involves a substantial extension of 
public ownership; the restoration of full employment; a commitment to increased 
economic, social and political equality; fundamental tax reform; a strong focus on 
environmental sustainability; and, last but not least, acceptance of international 
responsibility for global justice. This represents a real intellectual alternative to 
neoliberalism, but it is too early to say whether it also poses a significant political 
threat to the status quo. Much will depend on the consequences for the real economy 
of the 2008 global financial crisis. A severe world recession would greatly increase 
the political appeal of socialist and social democratic policies like those proposed 
here. 
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